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ORDER

* onan
CteTk. •" ..* Court
Utah Court of AppeaJs

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 900541-CA

v.
Jamis M. Johnson and Kent Davis,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion to
preclude appellee from oral argument filed March 11, 1991.
Appellant's motion is filed pursuant to R. 26, Utah R. App. P.,
based upon appellee's failure to file a brief "within the
applicable time period."
The court having considered the motion, and no response
having been filed in opposition thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that appellant's motion is granted; appellee is hereby precluded
from oral argument in this matter.
Dated this / f ^ d a v of April, 1991.
BY THE - COURT
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2A-3

(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).

The Supreme Court had original

appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (Supp.
1990), but has assigned the case for disposition in the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (Supp. 1990).

ISSUE
Whether the lower court abused its discretion by approving a
stipulation to which Plaintiff did not agree and which does not
include essential terms which Plaintiff required as a condition to
the

stipulation

regarding

the

even

though

no

record

hearing

in

which

the

or

transcript

parties

exists

presented

the

stipulation to the Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On Thursday, April 5, 1990, at 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff Juanita
Duncan ("Duncan"), Defendant Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson"), and
Defendant Kent Davis ("Davis") appeared at a settlement conference
before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the Fourth Judicial
District

Court of Wasatch

conference,

the

parties

County, Utah.
and

their
1

At

counsel,

the settlement
after

lengthy

discussion, agreed to certain monetary terms on which their dispute
could

be

settled.

As an additional

essential

term of the

agreement, Duncan's counsel demanded that the settlement include a
provision by which Davis would confess to a judgment for fraud in
the event of a default under the agreement or his filing of a
petition in bankruptcy.

The parties did not resolve the issue in

open court, but agreed that Duncan's counsel and Davis' counsel
would correspond with each other to prepare language acceptable to
Duncan.

Duncan's counsel stressed that the settlement would be

contingent on inclusion of acceptable language regarding bankruptcy
and

that

such

language would

be

an

essential

term

of

the

settlement. It was also agreed that Duncan's counsel would submit
a Stipulation and Order for Davis' counsel to review which would
become the final Order in the case.

These facts are more

particularly set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Kariya filed in
support of Duncan's Objection to the Order Dismissing Claims.

A

copy of the Affidavit has been attached and is incorporated herein
as Exhibit "A."
Following the Settlement Conference, Duncan's counsel mailed
a proposed Stipulation and Order to Larry Steele
counsel for Defendant Davis.

("Steele"),

The proposed Order included in

paragraph 3 a confession of a "judgment for actual fraud in the
event that [Davis] defaults under the terms of this Stipulation."
2

A copy of this proposed Stipulation and Order Dismissing Claims is
attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "B."

On April 10,

1990, Steele submitted to Duncan's counsel a proposed revision to
the Order which would not require Davis to confess fraud, but which
would require Duncan to prove fraud in the event of a default.
Duncan's counsel objected to the revision and refused to approve
the Order as to form or otherwise.

Because the parties could not

come to an agreement, both parties submitted their proposed Orders
to the court.
On May 4, 1990, notwithstanding the absence of the approval of
Duncan or her counsel, the court entered the Order Dismissing
Claims prepared by Steele, which conformed to Steele's proposed
revisions, which Duncan's counsel had rejected.

A copy of the

Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." The Order was not based
on any written stipulation, and is not supported by a court record
of any oral stipulation.

The same day, the court also made a

Minute Entry inviting the parties to raise any objections they may
have to the Order within 15 days, with instructions that if no such
objections were raised, the Order would become final.

A copy of

the Minute Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit "D."
On May 18, 1990, Duncan filed an Objection to Proposed Order
on

the ground

that

the Order did not properly

settlement agreement of the parties.
3

reflect the

Duncan was unable to obtain

a transcript of the Settlement Conference to support her Objection
because no such transcript existed due to a malfunction of the tape
recorder used to record the proceedings.

(See Statement Regarding

Transcript of Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit "E")•

Duncan

subsequently filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, to which
Davis, through his counsel, responded.

In a Ruling dated July 26,

1990, Judge Bullock overruled Duncan's Objection to the Order
Dismissing Claims and denied the Motion to Set Aside the Order
without making any specific findings of fact. A copy of the Ruling
is attached hereto as Exhibit "F."

It is from this Ruling that

Duncan appeals to this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Duncan's objection to the trial court's Order is two-fold.
First, the trial court violated Rule 4-504 (8) of the Code of
Judicial

Administration

which

requires

all

orders

based

on

stipulations to be supported by a written stipulation signed by the
parties or their attorneys or an oral stipulation made in open
court.

Second, Because the parties never reached agreement on

essential terms of the settlement agreement—namely, acceptable
language concerning Davis' confession of a judgment for fraud in
the event of his default or petition in bankruptcy—the parties
never reached a binding settlement agreement.
4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S ORDER DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4-504 OF THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

Rule 4-504 (8) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
states as follows:
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall
be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties
and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the
record.
In considering a rule of procedure almost identical to the abovequoted Rule, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that this requirement
was

intended

agreements.

to

avoid

the

inherent

uncertainty

of

verbal

Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex. 1984).

Under this rule, the court concluded that an oral settlement
agreement not in writing or on the record

"was disputed and

unenforceable at the moment its existence was denied in the
pleadings."

Id. at 530.

In the case at bar, the trial court failed to comply with Rule
4-504 (8). No written stipulation was ever signed by the parties
or entered by the judge. Moreover, because the trial court's tape
recorder malfunctioned, there is no record of a stipulation in open
court to support the Order.

By entering an Order unsupported by

either a written stipulation or a court record, the trial court
promoted exactly that which the Rule was designed to prevent:
enforcement of an agreement which no reliable evidence indicated
5

was the intent of the parties.

For this reason, the Order

Dismissing Claims should be set aside.

II.

THE COURT'S ORDER IMPOSED A CONTRACT ON THE PARTIES WHERE
NONE EXISTED.

While

the

law

favors

settlement

as

a

form

of

dispute

resolution, settlement agreements are contracts and are bound by
basic principles of contract law. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,
942 (Utah 1987); 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 7
(1976).

Duncan contends that sound principles of contract law

compel the conclusion that the parties failed to enter a binding
agreement.
Under basic contract law, no binding settlement agreement
exists unless the parties reach a meeting of the minds.

Cross v.

District Court, 643 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1982) (holding that "[i]n
order for a settlement to be binding and enforceable, there must be
a

N

meeting of the minds' as to the terms and conditions of the

compromise and settlement") (quoting H.W. Houston Construction
Company v. District Court, 632 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1981)); 15A Am.
Jur. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 7 (stating that "a valid
compromise requires the mutual assent of the parties, and the
meeting

of

agreement").

their minds

on

all

the

essential

terms

of

the

When an acceptance is given on terms substantially

different than those of the offer, it constitutes a counteroffer,
6

and does not create a contract.

Fratello v. Socorro Electric

Cooperative, Inc. , 107 N.M. 378, 758 P. 2d 792, 795 (1988) (refusing
to find a valid settlement agreement where the offeree's acceptance
was not unconditional, and stating that "[i]n order to constitute
a binding settlement contract, there must be an unconditional
acceptance of the offer made")

(quoting Silva v. Noble, 85 N.M.

677, 678, 515 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1973)).
Throughout this litigation and particularly in the settlement
negotiations at and prior to the Settlement Conference, Duncan has
demanded that any settlement include a provision by which Davis, at
such time as he should default under the settlement agreement,
would confess to a judgment of fraud against him which could not be
discharged in bankruptcy.

Davis now contends that he has never

agreed to this "essential term," and argues instead that the
opposite meaning, as expressed in his proposed Order Dismissing
Claims, was in fact the understanding of the parties.

Davis

offers, however, no evidence that Duncan or her counsel have agreed
to this term, and Duncan maintains that from the outset she has
refused to agree to any settlement which does not include a
confession of fraud.

Therefore, the parties have not reached a

meeting of the minds on the essential element concerning Davis'
potential bankruptcy, and the Order is thus based on an invalid
settlement agreement.
7

Under contract law, it is also clear that no settlement
agreement exists if there remains a fundamental disagreement on a
substantial term. Fratello v. Socorro Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
107 N.M. 378, 758 P.2d 792, 795 (1988).

The court in Gaines v.

Nortrust Realty Management, Inc., 422 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. App. 1982),
set down the minimum requirements for a binding settlement:
a fundamental principle of the law of contracts is that
there must be mutuality of agreement, and there can be no
such mutuality when there is no common intention. . . .
Thus, "[t]o be judicially enforceable . . . a settlement
agreement . . . must be sufficiently specific as to be
capable of implementation.
. . .[C]ourts will not
attempt to enforce a settlement agreement that is too
vague or ambiguous in its meaning or effect." United
Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
809-10 (3d Cir. 1981). Parties to a settlement agreement
must reach mutual agreement on every essential element of
the proposed settlement.
"For [a settlement] to be
binding on the parties it should be clear that it is full
and complete, covers all issues, and is understood by all
litigants concerned." Cross v. Cook, 14 7 Ga. App. 695,
250 S.E.2d 28, 29 (1978).
422 So. 2d at 1039-40 (citations omitted).
In the case before this Court, no binding oral settlement
agreement was reached because at the time of the Settlement
Conference, the parties had not yet resolved whether Davis would
confess a judgment of fraud in the event of default or bankruptcy.
In fact, from Duncan's perspective, the entire settlement agreement
was expressly conditioned on a satisfactory provision requiring
such a confession of fraud.

Therefore, because this substantial

term remains unresolved, no binding settlement contract exists.
8

Duncan further contends that the trial court was without
authority to impose the settlement agreement on the parties by
Order.

It is a well-settled proposition in Utah that a court

having before it a matter may summarily enforce a settlement
agreement between the parties, but that power does not allow the
court to create an agreement where none exists. Tracy-Collins Bank
and Trust Company v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979)
(holding that summary enforcement of settlement agreements is ill
suited to "situations presenting complex factual issues related
either to the formation or the consummation of the contract").

In

Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781
P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that a motion to compel
settlement may be granted only "if the record establishes a binding
agreement and

v

the excuse for non-performance is comparatively

unsubstantial.'" (quoting, Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company v.
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605,

609 (Utah 1979)).

The case at bar includes a complex array of claims for
fraudulent misrepresentation

against

two

separate defendants.

Moreover, the prospect of Davis filing bankruptcy, which has been
a key element of all settlement discussions throughout this case,
complicates the issues even further. Although the trial court had
authority to hear the case and enter judgment thereon, it did not
have the authority to impose a contract on the parties absent
9

mutual assent.

Therefore, Duncan contends that the court's entry

of the Order, in the complete absent of any evidence of an
agreement to which Duncan had assented, is tantamount to entry of
a judgment without a hearing and a clear abuse of discretion•
Finally, Duncan notes that a settlement contract necessarily
includes terms expressly required by the parties. Moreover, when
a party breaches a settlement agreement, the other party has an
option to rescind and proceed on the underlying claim.

Butcher v.

Gilrov, 744 P.2d 311, 312 n. 2 (Utah App. 1987).
In this case, any oral settlement agreement must necessarily
have contained a provision, as Duncan expressly demanded, requiring
Davis' confession of a fraud judgment in the event of default or
bankruptcy.

By submitting to the court a proposed Order with

language contrary to those terms, Davis has breached any oral
agreement that may have existed, and thus destroyed its binding
effect.

CONCLUSION
While Duncan concedes that settlement of claims is favorable
method of dispute resolution, she contends that allowing the trial
court's Order to stand would be an affront to normal settlement
processes and could actually deter settlement in the future.
First, the Order ignores Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
10

Administration which requires orders based on stipulations to be
supported by a writing or a statement on the record.

If an order

can be based upon an unrecorded oral stipulation as Davis alleges,
parties may be hesitant to discuss claims orally for fear that
their statements may be incorporated in a final order without their
consent.

Rule 4-504, when applied properly, removes this danger

from settlement negotiations.

Duncan thus urges this Court to

apply the Rule strictly to the facts of this case and set aside the
trial court's Order.
element

of mutual

Second, the trial court's Order removes the
intent

settlement agreement.

from the requirements

for a valid

Because no transcript of the Settlement

Conference is available, and the trial court in its denial of
Duncan's Objection to the Order did not make any findings of fact,
there is no evidence before this Court concerning the formation of
a settlement contract other than that set forth in memoranda,
affidavits, and other retrospective evidence. In this light, where
no hard evidence indicates mutual intent to contract, it is clearly
beyond the trial court's power to impose a contract on the parties
based on its recollection of the parties' interactions.

Duncan

contends that the above arguments compel the conclusion that entry
of the Order was an abuse of discretion and that the trial court's
denial of Duncan's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was error.

11

DATED this £B

day of January, 1991.
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, P.C.

flittnrnry-i

12

for Appalla

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned, Robert Kariya, of the law firm of Woodbury,
Jensen,

Kesler

&

Swinton,

P.C.,

counsel

for

the

Plaintiff/Appellant, hereby certifies that he caused four (4) true
and correct copies of the Brief of Appellant to be sent, U.S. First
Class Mail, postage pre-paid, to each of the following on the 29th
day of January, 1991:
Larry A. Steele, Esq.
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
A. Paul Schwenke, Esq.
P. 0. Box 7853
Murray, Utah 84107

WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, P.C.

EXHIBIT "A"

h

if

Russell S. Walker - #3363
Robert Kariya - #4858
Olga A. Bruno - #5259
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
265 East 100 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Telephone:
(801) 364-1100

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

JUANITA DUNCAN,
i

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT KARIYA

i

Civil N o . 6478

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, and
KENT DAVIS,

]i

Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Robert Kariya, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and
state that:
1.

I am a member of the Utah State Bar.

2.

I am

employed

by Woodbury,

Jensen,

Kesler

&

Swinton,

P.C., Attorneys at Law, the law firm which represents Plaintiff in
this matter,
3.

On Thursday, April 5, 1990, at 2:30 p.m., I represented

the Plaintiff in a settlement conference held in this matter before
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock.

4.

At the Settlement Conference, the parties agreed on terms

regarding the payment by Defendant Davis to Plaintiff of certain
sums of money for settlement of this case.

However, Davis'

counsel, Mr. Larry Steele, and I were to correspond with each other
and prepare suitable language for a stipulation regarding the
effect of a possible bankruptcy petition by Davis.

I stressed at

the Settlement Conference to all parties that settlement would be
contingent upon the parties arriving at agreeable language in the
stipulation regarding the possible bankruptcy.
5.

On April 10, 1990, Mr. Steele submitted to me a proposed

revision to paragraph three of the stipulation I had prepared,
which would materially change the context of the stipulation and
settlement of this case, by requiring Plaintiff to prove fraud in
the event of Davis files or reopens a bankruptcy case. It was my
understanding, and

Plaintiff's

requirement

confess to a judgment for fraud, pursuant

that Davis was to
to the Settlement

Conference, if he defaulted under the terms of the agreement.
6.

The

Order

Dismissing

Claims, which

was

apparently

entered by the Court, does not reflect the terras of the settlement
which Plaintiff intended or accepted at the Settlement Conference.
7.

On April 17, 1990 I contacted Diane Burgener, Deputy

Clerk of the Wasatch Clerk's office, and was told by Ms. Burgener
that a transcript of the settlement conference could not be made
2

because the electronic tape recorder which was used during the
conference had malfunctioned, and since no court reporter attended
the conference, no record of the settlement conference was made.
I confirmed this information with Ms. Burgener on May 15, 1990.
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this (Oftf

day of May, 1990.

^^

Robert Kariya

^

v

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this
My Commission Expires:
VACA C, fWP-

cJfajJj/MrtNOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Objection to Order Dismissing Claims were served, via first class
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this /P^"
day of May, 1990, to the
following:
Larry A. Steele
Attorney for Davis
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
Paul Schwenke
Attorney for Johnson
P.O. Box 57853
Murray, Utah 84107

W.<£^

rk.aff
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EXHIBIT "B"

Glen W. Roberts - #4172
Robert Kariya - #4858
Olga A. Bruno - #5259
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
265 East 100 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
JUANITA DUNCAN,

)
)

STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT
AND ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

i

Civil No. 6478

i

Judge J. Robert Bullock

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, and
KENT DAVIS,

1

Defendants.

STIPULATION
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan, Defendant Kent Davis ("Davis"), and
Defendant Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson"), in consideration of the
mutual covenants and conditions herein contained and for Ten
Dollars ($10-00) and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, hereby
set forth their Stipulation for Settlement ("Stipulationn) of the
above-described matter as follows:
1.

Dismissal,

Plaintiff shall dismiss with prejudice any

and all of her claims against Davis and Johnson; Defendant Johnson
shall dismiss with prejudice any and all of his claims against

Plaintiff and Davis; and Davis shall dismiss with prejudice any and
all of his claims against Plaintiff and Johnson in this matter,
upon execution of this Stipulation and the transfer to Plaintiff
by Davis of the consideration described in paragraph 1 (a) of this
Stipulation, subject to this case being reopened

for entry of

judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Davis in the event that
Davis does not make timely and accurate payment of $30,000, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum payable as follows:

2.

a.

Upon execution of this Stipulation, $2,000 in
certified funds; plus $4,500 which shall consist of
Warranty Deeds
("Deeds") conveying
good and
marketable title to those certain real properties
located in Wasatch County, state of Utah more
particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference incorporated herein;
and

b.

The sum of $200 beginning May 1, 1990, and
continuing on the first day of each and every month
thereafter until April 1, 19 94; and

c.

The sum of $1,000 on April 30, 1991, April 30, 1992,
and April 30, 1993; and

d-

On or before May
of the $30,000,
$23,500 on May 1,
made in a timely

Default.

1, 1994, the total unpaid balance
which should total approximately
1994 if all payments hereunder are
and accurate manner.

In the event of the failure of Davis to fulfill

his obligations and make timely payments under this Stipulation,
Plaintiff shall have the right, upon filing an affidavit of such
default after a period of twenty (20) days after the due date of

2

any payment required hereunder, without prior written notice to
Davis of her intention to obtain judgment against Davis, to reopen
this case and obtain an entry of judgment against Davis in the
amount of $30,000, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any
payments received by Plaintiff under the terms of this Stipulation.
3.

Judgment.

Davis hereby confesses judgment for actual

fraud, in favor of Plaintiff in the event he defaults under the
terms of this Stipulation, in the amount of $30,000, plus interest
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, plus reasonable attorney's
fees incurred herein, less any payments received by Plaintiff under
the terms of this Stipulation,

The judgment shall bear interest

at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until satisfied.
4.

Amendment. Any amendment, modification, termination, or

rescission affecting this Stipulation shall be made in writing and
signed by the parties.
5.

Effective Date. This Stipulation shall become effective

upon execution by the parties to this Stipulation, on the date so
executed.
6.

Successors. This Stipulation shall be binding upon, and

inure to the benefit of, the legal representatives, successors and
assigns of the parties hereto.

3

7.

Attorneys Fees.

Each party herein shall bear its own

fees and costs, including attorneys fees, incurred to date in
regard to this action, except as otherwise set forth herein.
8.

Notices.

Any

notice

required

or

desired

to

given

hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if sent by First Class U f S.
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed

to the respective parties as

follows:
JUANITA DUNCAN
C/0 WOODBURY, JENSEN,
KESLER & SWINTON, P.C.
265 EAST 100 SOUTH SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
KENT DAVIS
4543 HILLSIDE
VERNAL UT 84078
JAMIS M. JOHNSON
165 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE #300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

DATED this

day of April, 1990.

JUANITA DUNCAN

KENT DAVIS

JAMIS M. JOHNSON
4

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
WOODBURY, JENSEN,
KESLER & SWINTON, P.C.
By Robert Karj
Attorneys for Juanita Duncan
Larry A- Steele
Attorney for Kent Davis
A. Paul Schwenke
Attorney for Jamis M. Johnson
ORDER
Based upon the Stipulation for Settlement set forth above and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims of
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan against Jamis M. Johnson and Kent Davis;
and Jamis M. Johnson against Juanita Duncan in this case are hereby
dismissed with prejudice, subject to the case being reopened for
entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Kent Davis in
accordance with the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement.
ENTERED this

day of

, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable J. Robert Bullock
District Court Judge

5

EXHIBIT MA"
That certain real property situated in Wasatch County, State
of Utah and more particularly described as follows:
Lot 1
Lot 10, Block A, Soldier Summit Survey
Lot 2
Lot 15, Block 6, Soldier Summit Survey

EXHIBIT

W

CM

LARRY A. STEELE, #3090
Attorney for Defendant Kent Davis
319 West 100 Southf Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone (801) 789-1301
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUANITA DUNCAN,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS
Civil No. 6478

vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON and
KENT DAVIS,

Judge J. Robert Bullock

Defendants•
Plaintiff

Juanita

Defendant Kent Davis
making

a

special

Duncan

with

her

attorney

Bob

Kariya,

("Davis") with Larry A. Steele an attorney

appearance,

and

Defendant

Jamis

M#

Johnson

("Johnson") with his attorney, all appearing before the Court and
discussing the issues and in consideration of the mutual covenants
and

conditions

Stipulation

for

herein

contained,

Settlement

the

parties

set

forth

their

("Stipulation") on

the

record

at a

hearing held before this Court on April

5, 1990, of the above-

described matters and which Stipulation entered was as follows:
!•

Dismissal.

Plaintiff shall dismiss with prejudice any and

all of her claims against

Davis and Johnson; Defendant
1

Johnson

shall dismiss with prejudice any and all of his claims against
Plaintiff and Davis; and Davis shall dismiss with prejudice any and
all of his claims against

Plaintiff and Johnson

in this matter,

upon execution of this Stipulation and the transfer to Plaintiff by
Davis of the consideration described
Stipulation, subject
judgment

to

this case

in paragraph 1 (a) of this

being

in favor of Plaintiff against

reopened

Davis

for

entry of

in the event that

Davis does not make timely and accurate payment of $30,000.00, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum payable as follows:
a.
Upon execution of this Stipulation,
$2,000.00 in certified funds; plus $4,500.00
which
shall
consist
of
Warranty
Deeds
("Deeds") conveying good and marketable title
to those certain real properties located in
Wasatch
County,
State
of
Utah,
more
particularly described in Exhibit "AM attached
hereto and by this reference incorporated
herein; and
b* The sum of $200.00 beginning May 1, 1990,
and continuing on the first day of each and
every month thereafter until April 1, 1994;
and
cThe sum of $1,000.00 on April 30, 1991,
April 30, 1992, and April 30, 1993; and
d. On or before May 1, 1994, the
balance of the $30,000.00, which
approximately $23,500.00 on May
all payments hereunder are made
and accurate manner2.

Default •

total unpaid
should total
1, 1994, if
in a timely

In the event of the failure of Davis to fulfill

his obligations and make timely payments under this Stipulation,
2

Plaintiff shall have tl

right, upon filing an a(

idav)t of such

default after a period of twenty (20) days after the due da~te of
any payment

required

hereunder, without

prior

written notice to

Davis of her intention to obtain judgment against Davis, to reopen
this case and obtain an entry of judgment

against Davis

in the

amount of $30,000.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any
payments received by Plaintiff under the terms of this Stipulation*
3.

Judgment.

In the event Davis defaults under the terms of

this Stipulation, Davis hereby confesses judgment in the amount of
$30,000,00, plus interest

thereon at the rate of 10% per annum,

plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any payments
received by Plaintiff

under the terms of this Stipulation.

judgment shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent
annum

until

satisfied-

In

the

event

Davis

The

(10%) per

defaults

in

the

performance of this Stipulation and files or reopens a bankruptcy
case, Davis agrees and stipulates that any automatic stay imposed
by the Bankruptcy Court will not prevent Plaintiff from entering a
judgment under the terms of this paragraph and this Stipulation.
By this Stipulation, Plaintiff does not waive any of her rights to
present evidence of fraud

in defense of any action by Davis to

discharge Plaintiff's claim in bankruptcy.
4.

Amendment.

Any amendment, modification, termination, or
3

rescission affecting this Stipulation shall be made in writing and
signed by the parties.
5.

Effective Date.

This Stipulation shall become effective

upon execution by the parties to this Stipulation, on the date so
executed*
6*

Successors.

This Stipulation shall be binding upon, and

inure to the benefit of, the legal representatives, successors and
assigns of the parties hereto.
7.
fees and

Attorney's Fees.
costs,

including

Each party herein shall bear its own
attorney's

fees, incurred

to date in

regard to this action.
8.

Notices.

Any

notice required

or desired

to be given

hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if sent by First Class U« S.
Hail, postage

prepaid,

addressed

to

the

respective

parties as

follows:
Juanita Duncan
c/o WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent Davis
966 North 2100 West
Vernal, Utah 84078
Jamis M. Johnson
165 South West Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Based upon the Stipulation for Settlement set forth above and
4

good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims of
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan against Jamis M. Johnson and Kent Davis;
and Jamis M, Johnson against Juanita Duncan in this case are hereby
dismissed with prejudicef subject
entry of judgment

in favor

to the case being reopened for

of Plaintiff

against

Kent Davis in

accordance with the terms of this Stipulation for Settlement.
ENTERED this

day of

, 1990BY THE COURT:

Honorable J. Robert Bullock
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, P.C.

By: Robert Kariya
Attorneys for Juanita Duncan

A. Paul "S^tfwenke
Attorney for Jamis M, Johnson

thurs

5

Lot 1
Lot 10f Block A, Soldier Summit

Survey

Lot 2
Lot 15, Block 6, Soldier Summit Su

lurs

6

rvey

EXHIBIT "D"

HJMAY
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

7 v^u J

COORT"

WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

JUANITA DUNCAN
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number:

6478

MAY 4, 1990
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE

JAMIS M. JOHNSON and
KENT DAVIS,

MINUTE ENTRY

Defendant.
**********

It is the Court's recollection that a stipulation of the
parties was arrived at on the record on April 5, 1990,
substantially as set forth in the proposed Order Dismissing Claims
prepared by counsel for Kent Davis, and mailed to the Court under
date of April 16, 1990.
As of this date the court has signed the propsoed order
and the Court Clerk in Utah County will forward said Order to the
Court Clerk in Wasatch County for filing.
Within 15 days from this date any party who contends that
the original Order does not reflect the stipulation, substantially
in substance and effect may file a written motion to set aside the
Order, accompanied by a transcript of the proceedings.

If any

such motion and transcript are filed within said 15 day period,
the Court will fix a time for oral argument thereon, otherwise the
Order shall become final, and the parties will forthwith comply
with the terms thereof.

EXHIBIT

n

"M

Jeffrey K. Woodbury - #4172
Robert Kariya - #4858
Olga A. Bruno - #5259
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
265 East 100 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AN! i I'OK WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
JUANITA DUNCAN,
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON and
KENT DAVIS,

STATEMENT REGARDING TRANSCRIPT
OF PROCEEDINGS
" I, 1

)

• i

)

Jucige J . Robert bullock

Defendants..
Comes now the appellant, Juanita Duncan, by and through
com ise.,1 of : ecoi d . Robert Ka r i ya , of., the law firm of "woodbury,
Jensen, Kesier c* Swinton , P.C. and pursuant to Rule i i v t, , i

""he

Utah Rules cr the Appellant Procedure, hereby states tnat Appellant
canno i

i

conference ne„c Apr: •

. .^
,

-• * ;. .

u__

~nrr

because er

settlement
;^rd

recording of the proceedings was defective en: :.c f tner transcript
exists .'
Appellant war directed b* Jucg^ J
copy

oi 11 Ie zx" ar

along with Aooellan;

Robert Bulloch to ii.ie a

- ttiemert
r^L JL ;

-

s^^

r

conference oroceedincs

.s_ce Aooeiiee'b

o: ;::;>...?sec

Order discussing claims, pursuant to the Kinute Entry, dated May 4,
1990.

However, when Appellant requested a copy of the transcript

from the court clerk, she discovered none existed-

Consequently,

Appellant is unable to request that a transcript of the April 5,
1990 proceedings be filed at this time.
DATED this 5th day of September, 1990.
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, P.C.

1

^A/za/ /^^

Robert Iuiriyg
Attorney for Appe ilaCT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid by U.S.
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Statement of Issues
on Appeal on this
./g^L.
day of September, 19 9 0 to the
following:
Larry A. Steele
Attorney for Kent Davis
319 west 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84 07 8
Paul Schwenke
Attorney for Jamis Johnson
P.O. Box 57853
Murray, Utah 84107
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Fourth District Court Clerk
Wasatch County
25 N. Main
Heber City, Utah 84032

F:\r.isc\Ouncin.s:a

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

JUANITA DUNCAN,
Case Number:

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

JAMIS JOHNSON,

Civil Number 6478

Defendant.
**********

Counsel having requested that Plaintiffs Motion to Set
Aside Order Dismissing claims be submitted to the Court for
decision, and the Court having reviewed the file, including all
affidavits and memoranda pertaining thereto filed herein, and
having fully considered the legal positions of counsel, now rules,
holds and decides as follows:
1.

All objections to the Court's Order Dismissing Claims

dated May 4, 1990, are overrruled.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside said Order dated May

31, 1990, is hereby denied.

/

Dated at Provo, Utah, this

day of July, 1990.

BY THE COURT

ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE

